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THE CONQUEST OF HERACLAEA OF THRACE BY THE GENOESE IN 1351

*This paper is dedicated to Mr. Benjamin Hendrickx,
Professor Emeritus of the University of Johannesburg, South Africa.*

Abstract: *In this paper, the conquest of Heraclaea of Thrace (nowadays Ereğli or Marmaraereğlisi) by the Genoese in 1351 is presented in detail. The causes which led to the conquest of the city are examined. Additionally, what is further examined is the situation in which the city was in combination with the efforts undertaken, after the conquest, by the metropolitan of Heraclaea Philotheos Kokkinos (1347-1353) and then patriarch of Constantinople (1353-1354, 1364-1376), in order to return the scattered inhabitants back to their city and to restore life again in Heraclaea. What is concluded is that the Byzantine Empire, a century before its final conquest by the Ottoman Turks in 1453, cannot oppose – because of its weakness – a strong defense against its enemies. Furthermore, the Byzantine dominion and the seas had become the ground of action and competition of foreign forces (in the specific case of the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa). The Byzantine Empire had nothing to win from this competition. On the contrary, it was humiliated and had to confront with disasters (for example, the above-mentioned conquest of Heraclaea).*

Keywords: *Heraclaea, Thrace, Genoese, conquest, Philotheos Kokkinos, Galatas.*

In the midst of the 14th c. and particularly in the 23rd of October 1351 a shocking and unexpected fact for the Byzantium, the siege and conquest of Heraclaea of Thrace by the Genoese occurred. Information for this incident is derived especially from the “*Historical Speech*” for the conquest of Heraclaea, which was written – a year afterwards, in October 1352 – by the metropolitan of this city and then patriarch of Constantinople Philotheos Kokkinos¹ and

¹ Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος*: The conquest of Heraclaea took place actually in the 23rd of October 1351. See: Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 235.1-2 «Ἔτος μὲν ἦν ἐξηκοστὸν ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου πρὸς τοῖς ὀκτακοσίοις τε καὶ τοῖς ἑξακισχιλίοις (6860)...», 245.320-322 «Πρώτη μὲν οὖν ἦν ἐπὶ εἰκάδι, τῷ Ὀκτωβρίῳ πέμπτης ἐπινεμήσεως ἱσταμένης· οἱ δὲ (Genoese) κατὰ ἴρουσι δειλῆς ὀνίας, ὡς ὄφελόν γε πρότερον εἰς ἄδου κινήν, εἰς τοὺς Ἡρακλείας λιμένας» and 248.398-400 «Ἐάλω μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγάλη καὶ θαυμαστὴ πόλις αὕτη νόμῳ πολιορκίας, κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἡμέραν, τρίτην οὖσαν μετὰ τὴν ἐνταῦθα τοῦ στόλου (of the Genoese) κάθοδον, περὶ ἕκτην, οἶμαί που, τῆς ἡμέρας ὦραν...». Since the month is the October, deducts someone from the year 6860 from the creation of the World (Anno Mundi), the 5509 and finds the year from the Christ birth which is the 1351. The Genoese came to the port of Heraclaea in the afternoon of the 21st of October and the third day, i.e. in the 23rd of October 1351 at noon (6th hour of the day), took place the conquest of the city; Philotheos finished the writing of his *Speech* for the conquest of Heraclaea about a year afterwards, in the 26th of October 1352, the name day of Saint Demetrius. See: Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 263.873-876 «Εἰ δ’ ὅτι καὶ κατ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ἡμέραν τοῦ μάρτυρος (Saint Demetrius) καὶ ὁ περὶ τούτων ἐξείρησται

secondary from the historical sources of the epoch, i.e. the “History” of John Cantacuzenus² and the “Roman History” of Nicephorus Gregoras³.

Heraclaea, the ancient Perinthos, colony of Samos, nowadays Ereğli or Marmaraereğlisi, was an important coastal city in the north, European coasts of Propontis (Sea of Marmara) and one of the most historical cities of Thrace. It was built in 600 B.C. on a rocky hill and had two natural harbours, one to the east and one to the west. Heraclaea was encircled by a strong wall, which is preserved until nowadays in a good height. What remains from the formerly brilliant ancient and Byzantine city today is an immense necropolis of marbles and ruins⁴.

Concerning the administration, during the Early Byzantine period, Heraclaea was the capital of the province of Europe in the dioecesis of Thrace⁵. Later, when the theme of Thrace was organized in the end of the 7th c. (680-687), Heraclaea was the seat of the general of the theme, alternately with Arcadioupolis (nowadays Lüleburgaz)⁶.

In the ecclesiastical field, Heraclaea was a metropolis already from the beginning of the 4th c.⁷ Among the others subjected to Heraclaea bishoprics⁸ was the bishopric of Byzantium. However, because Byzantium as Constantinople and New Rome was from the year 324 onwards the capital of Byzantine Empire, the bishopric of Byzantium for political reasons stopped to be subjected to the metropolis of Heraclaea, raised in an archbishopric and then in a patriarchat (381) and more especially Oecumenical patriarchat from the end of the 6th c. In every election of a new Oecumenical patriarch, as an indication of the ancient regime, the metropolitan of Heraclaea and exarch of the Thracian dioecesis gave to him the pastoral staff, as evidence of his ancient glory and authority⁹.

Heraclaea maintained its significance and importance during the long lasting history of the Byzantine Empire. Before its conquest by the Genoese in 1351, it had come before at the beginning of the 14th c. and particularly in May 1305 the siege of the city by the Catalans, who devastated the countryside and killed many citizens. But it is not sure whether the Catalans succeeded to capture Heraclaea¹⁰.

Concerning the specific conquest of the 23rd of October 1351, one should notice, that when it happened, the metropolitan of Heraclaea Philotheos Kokkinos (May 1347-1353) was not in the city, because, as a member of the Holy Synod, he was, after the Easter of 1351, in

λόγος ἡμῖν οὕτωςι κατὰ δύναμιν, ἐνιαυτοῦ παραρηκόντος ὄλου, κἀνταῦθα μετὰ τὴν τῆς πόλεως ἄλωσιν...».

2 Io. Cantacuzenus III. 209 seq.

3 Niceph. Gregoras III. 76 seq.

4 Παπαζώτος 1989, 549-550; Külzer 2008, 398 seq.

5 Κυριαζόπουλος 2000, 79-80; Külzer 2008, 399.

6 Κυριαζόπουλος 2000, 84-87; Külzer 2008, 400.

7 Asdracha 1988, 228.

8 Bishoprics of the metropolis of Heraclaea during the Middle Byzantine period were: Theodoroupolis (nowadays Kineklü), Raedestos (nowadays Tekirdağ), Panion (the ancient Bisanthe, nowadays Barbaros), Chersonesos / Hexamilion (the ancient Lysimacheia, nowadays Eksamil), Callipolis or Calliopolis (nowadays Gelibolu), Charioupolis (nowadays Hayrabolu), Chalkis (nowadays Charakli, in the region of Metrae), Daonion or Daneion (nowadays Eski Ereğli), Madytos (nowadays Eceabad), Pamphylon (nowadays Uzun Köprü), Medeia (the ancient Salmydessos, nowadays Midye), Lizikos (unidentified), Sergente (nowadays Istrandja), Metrae (nowadays Çatalca), Tzouroulon (nowadays Çorlu), Peristasis (nowadays Hosköy), Athyras (nowadays Büyük Çekmece) and Lithoprosopon (unidentified). Many of the above mentioned bishoprics were raised afterwards, during the Late Byzantine period and especially in the 14th c., into archbishoprics or metropolitan bishoprics. See: Asdracha 1988, 247-258.

9 Βαβούσκος 1989, 34-35; Κυριαζόπουλος 2000, 252-253.

10 Külzer 2008, 403.

Constantinople¹¹. On the 28th of May of the same year he participated in a synod in Constantinople, which was convoked by the patriarch Callistos I (1350-1353, 1355-1363) against Barlaam and Akindynos and in fact Philotheos was the writer of the Volume (Tome) of the above mentioned synod¹². When he was still in Constantinople, the dramatic news of the conquest of Heraclaea reached him. A year later, in 1352, as already it is previously mentioned, Philotheos wrote his *Historical Speech* about the conquest of the city, which is for this research paper the main source of information.

Nicephorus Gregoras, on his side, antihesyhast, adversary and opponent of Philotheos Kokkinos, accuses him directly of the fact that as a metropolitan, he was absent from his city at the time in when it was plundered and suffered from the enemies Genoese and also of the fact that he neglected and did not pay attention for his flock¹³. Certainly, as one shall see then, Philotheos came back soon in Heraclaea and helped towards the raise and restoration of life in the city. But for the averting of the hostile danger, a strong military defense should be organized, which was almost not existent. Gregoras was partially right, when, during the siege of Heraclaea, Philotheos Kokkinos, the ecclesiastical leader, was not present in order to encourage morally and spiritually its citizens.

Later in September of 1353 Philotheos Kokkinos was elected as patriarch of Constantinople (two patriarchates, Sept. 1353-Nov.1354 and 1364-1376). He was one of the most important Oecumenical patriarchs of the 14th c. Exceptional writer, he administrated the Church with prudence and experience. Philotheos was born in Thessaloniki in about 1300 and had Hebrew descent from the side of his mother. He received a very good education, since he attended classes of the well-known scholar Thomas Magistros (Theodoulos the Monk). When he was young, he became a monk and went to practice solitary life to the Holy Mountain (monasteries of Vatopedi and Lavra). He lived from close all the disputes between hesyhasts and anti-hesyhasts and consciously chose the hesyhastic party of Gregory Palamas, metropolitan of Thessaloniki (1349-1359). For this reason, during the civil and dynastic war between the families of Cantacuzenus and Palaeologus (1341-1347) he supported the side of John Cantacuzenus¹⁴.

Patriarch Philotheos followed a clear orthodox policy and opposed strongly to the subjection of the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church to the Pope. Because of this fact, he came into rupture with the philenotics of his epoch (like Demetrius Kydonis). After his death in 1377 or 1378 he was honoured as a Saint by the Eastern Orthodox Christian Church¹⁵.

11 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 237 not.5, 240.146-151 «... ἔξεισιν (Philotheos) αὐτίκα μετὰ τὴν ἱερὰν τελετὴν, τοῦ μεγάλου φημὶ Πάσχα, πρὸς αὐτῆς τῆς καινῆς ἑβδομάδος τῷ τέλει (the week after Easter), ... τοῦ λοιποῦ καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀναχωρῶν ἦν ἐν τῇ βασιλίδι (Constantinople)» and 252.545, 253.546-549 «Ὁ δὲ τῆς δοριαλώτου πόλεως ἐκείνης (Heraclaea) ἐπίσκοπος (Philotheos) παρὰ τῇ βασιλευούσῃ (Constantinople) διατρίβων τῶν πόλεων, ... ἐπει τὴν αἰφνίδιον ἐκείνης ἄλωσιν μάθοι καὶ τὴν κατασκαφὴν, τὸν τε φόνον τῶν πολιτῶν καὶ τὴν αἰχμαλωσίαν καὶ τὸν πολὺν ἀνδραποδισμόν».

12 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 241.175-202; Concerning the patriarch of Constantinople Callistos I. See: Γόνης 1980.

13 Niceph. Gregoras III. 79.24, 80.1-5 «τηνικαῦτα δ' ἅπην ὁ τῆς πόλεως (Heraclaea) ἐπισκοπικῶς προΐστασθαι λαχὼν (Philotheos) Κόκκινος· οὕτω γὰρ ἐκαλεῖτο διὰ τὸ πυρῶδες καὶ ἄγριον τῆς ὄψεως ὁ ποιμενικὸς πατήρ. ἔτυχε γὰρ ἐν Βυζαντίῳ, ταῖς μὲν τοῦ Παλαμᾶ καινοφρονίας πάσῃ γνώμῃ καὶ σπουδῇ συμμαχῶν, τοῦ δὲ ποιμνίου μικρὰ φροντίζων» and 81.8-11 «τοῦ δὲ ποιμνίου σαραττομένου μάλα πικρῶς ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων (Genoese) ἐκεῖ καὶ ἀφειδῶς ὑπὲρ χρημάτων πάντων καὶ παντοδαπῶν αἰκίζομένου νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἡμέλει (Philotheos),...».

14 PLP nr. 11917; Νεράντζη-Βαρμάζη 2005, 147-148; For John Cantacuzenus, Emperor of Byzantium (1347-1354). See: Nicol 1968, 35-103.

15 Νεράντζη-Βαρμάζη 2005, 148.

Heraclaea «ἡ μεγάλη καὶ θαυμαστή», «ἡ περιώνυμος πόλις»¹⁶ (*the great and admirable, the famous city*) was conquered by the Genoese in October 1351. Its conquest is one of the significant incidents of the war – once again – which burst out in that time (1350-1351) between Venice and Genoa¹⁷.

The competition between the two Italian naval cities for the commerce of the Aegean sea and generally of the Eastern Mediterranean resulted in four great wars between them during the 13th and 14th c.: in 1258-1270, in 1294-1299, in 1350-1351 and in 1375-1381. Genoa obtained at a later stage compared to other Italian cities, like Venice and Pisa, commercial privileges in Byzantine Empire, as its first commercial deals were agreed in 1155. Since then, with the treaty of Nymphaion in 1261, it obtained commercial centres in Chios, Lesbos and Smyrna, as well as privileges in all the Byzantine Empire. In 1267, it was conceded to Genoa for commercial centre across the Constantinople, Galatas (the Peran), which was fortified in 1302 with a strong wall. In 1304 it was given the monopoly of alum in Phocaea in Asia Minor. Furthermore, Genoa had and the colony of Kaffa in Crimaea. Generally, the inclination of Genoa – contrary to Venice – was to leave the exploitation and the administration of its regions in Aegean sea to the hands of families, groups or companies (like for example the family of Gattilusio in Lesbos)¹⁸.

The venetian-geoese war of 1350-1351 burst out because Genoa attempted to obtain the control over all the commerce of the Euxeinus Pontos (Black Sea) and even more tried to hold back the entrance of foreign ships there¹⁹ (*πλεονεξίας ἔνεκα τῆς κακίστης καὶ τοῦ βούλεσθαι καὶ γῆς καὶ θαλάττης καὶ πάντων τυραννεῖν ἀλογίστως*²⁰ – *because of the bad greed and because Genoa wanted to administrate with tyranny thoughtless in all, in the earth and in the sea*). In this war, which was not them and thus did not want to engage, the Byzantines, either by need or because they convinced to engage, in any case unwillingly, they allied and supported with their ships (as many as they had been left) by the side of the Venetians. This fact was the reason – according to patriarch Philotheos – for the conquest of Heraclaea, since the Genoese considered the Byzantines as enemies²¹.

In order to justify the position of Byzantines in this war (for the Venetians and against the Genoese), Philotheos lays emphasis on the fact that Genoese, who were established across the Constantinople, in Galata, were bad neighbors and created troubles and disputes every day²². Furthermore, he characterizes them as «τετυφωμένους» (*extremely arrogant*), «βαρβάρους» (*barbarians to the mankind and to the soul*), «ψευδόχριστους καὶ μαρούς» (*false Christians and filthies*), «ἀσεβέστατον ἔθνος οὐνικόν» (*unfaithful hunnic people*), who distinguished for the greedy love of money («ἄπληστον φιλοχρηματιάν»)²³.

While Galatas was excluded and besieged by a small fleet of the Venetians and Byzantines (with 14 and 10 ships correspondingly), the Genoese fleet, which consisted of 60 ships, hurried to help the fellows Genoese, who lacked food and to protect the basis of Galatas. Since the Genoese fleet passed from Tenedos island, where provisioned peacefully and also from Hellespontos, came into Propontis (Sea of Marmara) and moored in Heraclaea (21st of October 1351)²⁴.

16 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 248.398, 249.421.

17 Ostrogorsky 1981, 225; Λοκ 1998, 266; Nicol 2012, 371-372.

18 Λοκ 1998, 263-269; Laiou-Morrisson 2011, 289-291; For the suburb of Constantinople, Galatas (Peran), where it was organized the neighborhood and the commercial centre of Genoese. See: Janin 1964, 56-57, 251-253, 457-458, 464.

19 Ostrogorsky 1981, 225; Laiou-Morrisson 2011, 291.

20 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 245.304-308.

21 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 245.304-319; Nicol 2012, 372.

22 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 245.308-313.

23 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 245.304, 250.457, 459-460, 462.

24 Niceph. Gregoras III. 76.3-10, 77.14-22, 78.1-15; Io. Cantacuzenus III. 209.3-15.

In Heraclaea, several Genoese sailors landed to the earth «πρὸς λαχανισμὸν», i.e. in order to provision vegetables from the gardens around the city. The citizens captured them in an ambush and killed them (only two of them refers John Cantacu-zenus). This incident provoked the anger of Genoese, having prepared for attack. Vainly the general and commander of the fleet Paganis (Paganino Doria), a man experienced and decent, with a good mood to the Emperor John Cantacuzenus (1347-1354), tried to avert them, in order not to pay attention to the incident and to continue their course to Constantinople. His objective was not to engage in a battle but the whole fleet to come safe and sound to help Galatas. There they could convince the Byzantine Emperor to close the treaty with the Venetians and to ally with them²⁵.

But one of the commanders of the Genoese ships, Martino Demoro threatened the commander of the fleet that he will denounce him to the municipality of Genoa for betrayal, because it was an opportunity to hit the enemies, so Paganis was forced to give the order for attack. Actually, the Genoese encircled Heraclaea from the earth and from the sea²⁶.

The citizens of Heraclaea were unarmed and unprepared for battle²⁷. Furthermore it seems that the leading class of the city was unjust and oppressed the poors («τοὺς πένητας»), so it did not exist in the city an atmosphere of unity and agreement, but of laziness and negligence²⁸. Except for this, into the Heraclaea refugees peasants from the around countryside of Thrace – because of the generally unsafety – had been gathered with their possessions²⁹ [we meet this phenomenon in the same epoch, in the decade of the civil war of 1340, in the monastery of Cosmosoteira in Bera (nowadays Pherres), where villagers peasants from the around countryside had searched for shelter inside its walls]³⁰. Therefore the city was without defense, since it was administrated by «ἐμπαίικτας... καὶ νεανίσκους»³¹ (by men very young without experience, who mocked the citizens). The commander of Heraclaea (whose the name is not mentioned on the sources) abandoned the city during its conquest with some of his men³².

Consequently, it was very easy for the Genoese to capture Heraclaea. Although a battle had happened in front of the city walls, the Genoese managed to climb with ladders the walls – especially these to the side of the land, which were more vulnerable – and others invaded into the city from the western gate. In this way Heraclaea was conquered completely «κατὰ κράτος» (23rd of October 1351)³³.

The assistance which was sent from the Byzantium, i.e. the army of horsemen sent by the Emperor, the army that came in situ with the *despotes* Nicephorus, son-in-law of Cantacuzenus and commader of the thracian cities of Hellespontos, as well as the army sent from Bizye (nowadays Vize), from the *despotes* Manuel Assanes, brother of the Empress Irene, all of them they did not manage to avert the conquest of the Heraclaea³⁴.

25 Io. Cantacuzenus III. 209.15-24, 210.1-14; Niceph. Gregoras III. 78.15-23, 79.1-9; Concerning Paganis <Toria> (Paganino Doria). See: PLP nr. 29093.

26 Io. Cantacuzenus III. 210.14-24, 211.1-4; About Martino Demoro. See: PLP nr. 20758.

27 Io. Cantacuzenus III. 211.6-8; Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 245.325-328, 246.329.

28 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 236.15-26, 248.401-405.

29 Niceph. Gregoras III. 79.18-21.

30 Χαριζάνης 2003, 141-142.

31 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 246.331-332.

32 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 249.423-425.

33 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 249.421-423; Io. Cantacuzenus III. 211.4-8; Balard 1970, 441; Külzer 2008, 403; Nicol 2012, 372.

34 Io. Cantacuzenus III. 211.8-22; For the title of *despotes*. See: Σταυρίδου-Ζαφράκα 2016, V, 73-97; Concerning the *despotes* Manuel Assanes (Comnenos Raoul). See: PLP nr. 1506 and Asdracha 1976, 193; About Bizye (nowadays Vize). See: Παπαζώτος 1989, 554; Külzer 2008, 288-294; For the Empress Irene Asanina Cantacuzene. See: Nicol 1968, 104-108.

Many from the citizens and especially these from the low social class («μόλιστα τοῦ δήμου») managed to escape³⁵. Others were slaughtered (the sea filled with bodies)³⁶. The churches were profaned³⁷. Many women found shelter and asylum in the great church of Heraclaea and so the enemies did not hurt them³⁸. The Genoese grabbed the money, the products, the wheat and whatever valuable they found. They took as captives the citizens, who were not killed, especially of the high social class («τοὺς ἀρίστους»). They left a small part of the fleet (three ships) as garrison of the city and they sailed for Galatas³⁹. When they reached there, they took positions to Bosporos and to the entrance of the Euxeinos Pontos. It was difficult for the Genoese to cause any damage to Constantinople, because, in comparison with Heraclaea, Constantinople was already well prepared. But Genoese managed to capture Sozopolis (nowadays Sozopol) on the western coasts of Euxeinos Pontos, a very rich and very crowded city of the Romans /Byzantines («βαθύπλουτον τε καὶ πολυάνθρωπον πόλιν Ῥωμαίων»), in November of 1351⁴⁰.

The Genoese closed the captives of Heraclaea into the prisons of the fortress of Galatas, and they shared the spoils with other fellows Genoese⁴¹. It was significant the contribution of the metropolitan Philotheos to the liberation of the captives («ὁ καλὸς ποιμὴν, τὴν ψυχὴν ἔθηκεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ ποιμνίου»). He applied to the Emperor and to the wealthy («προέχοντες») and rich of the Constantinople, who contributed a great part of the ransom money. He passed everyday across the Constantinople to Galatas and discussed with the Genoese the destiny of the captives, his flock. For his good manners, his virtue and his wisdom, the Genoese respected him and estimated him very much. So, he succeeded by paying in or in many cases without paying in ransom money the liberation of all the captives, even the most humbles⁴².

The next step was the return of the captives and the resettlement of Heraclaea, fact that was finally succeeded seven months after its conquest, i.e. in May of 1352. Great was of course and in this part the contribution of the metropolitan Philotheos, who gathered in the city the dispersed here and there citizens and gave to Heraclaea life again. He returned to the city in 27th July of the same year. With prayers, hymns and speeches he supported the citizens morally and spiritually. He brought holy vessels, books and icons from the monasteries of Constantinople in the place of these, which during the conquest had been destroyed. But the most important is that he introduced to the Emperor and succeeded tax freedom («ἀτέλεια») for the citizens of Heraclaea (and Sozopolis) and in this way the city quickly recovered, raised and came to its previous – before the conquest – condition⁴³.

In conclusion, the following should be observed:

1. The formerly vast Byzantine Empire, a century before its final fall to the Ottoman Turks in 1453, had been reduced in its extent and economically weak and politically dispersed could not oppose a strong defense and resistance against its enemies⁴⁴ (for example the conquest of Heraclaea and in many other cases).

35 Io. Cantacuzenus III. 211.22-24, 212.1-3.

36 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 249.426-445.

37 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 250.452-458.

38 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 250.475-484, 251.485-514, 252.515-522.

39 Io. Cantacuzenus III. 212.7-16; Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 252.523-530.

40 Niceph. Gregoras III. 82.17-23, 83.1-23, 84.1-5; Io. Cantacuzenus III. 215.5-22; Balard 1970, 442 seq.; Nicol 2012, 372-373; Concerning Sozopolis (the ancient Apollonia). See: Soustal 1991, 454-456.


41 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 252.529-544.

42 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 252.545, 253.546-576, 254.577-583, 256.652-677; Io. Cantacuzenus III. 217.4-23, 218.1-5; Külzer 2008, 404.

43 Φιλόθεος πατριάρχης, *Λόγος* 257.683-708, 258.709-737; Io. Cantacuzenus III. 218.5-23; Külzer 2008, 404; Nicol 2012, 372; For the *ἀτέλεια*, the exemption from taxes. See: Καραγιαννόπουλος 2000, 170-171.

44 Ostrogorsky 1981, 222-223; Nicol 2012, 331 seq.

2. Furthermore, the Byzantine dominion and the seas became the ground of action and competition of foreign states (specifically the Italian cities of Venice and Genoa)⁴⁵. The Byzantine Empire had nothing to win from this competition. On the contrary it payed the damages, was humiliated and had to confront with disasters. The above mentioned foreign naval forces devastated and exploited even the last resources of the Byzantine Empire.



45 Лок 1998, 231 seq.

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**Η ΑΛΩΣΗ ΤΗΣ ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΑΣ ΤΗΣ ΘΡΑΚΗΣ
ΑΠΟ ΤΟΥΣ ΓΕΝΟΥΑΤΕΣ ΤΟ 1351**

Στο παρόν άρθρο παρουσιάζεται λεπτομερειακά η άλωση της Ηράκλειας της Θράκης από τους Γενουάτες το 1351. Διερευνώνται τα αίτια που οδήγησαν στην άλωση της πόλης, γίνεται αναφορά στην κατάσταση στην οποία αυτή βρισκόταν, καθώς και στις προσπάθειες που κατέβαλε μετά την άλωση ο μητροπολίτης της Φιλόθεος Κόκκινος (1347-1353) και μετέπειτα πατριάρχης Κωνσταντινουπόλεως (1353-1354, 1364-1376) για να επιστρέψουν οι σκορπισμένοι κάτοικοι πίσω στην πόλη και να αποκατασταθεί σε αυτήν ξανά η ζωή. Εκείνο το οποίο συμπεραίνεται είναι ότι η Βυζαντινή Αυτοκρατορία έναν περίπου αιώνα πριν από την τελική πτώση της στους Οθωμανούς Τούρκους το 1453, δεν μπορούσε – εξαιτίας της αδυναμίας της – να αντιτάξει σθεναρή άμυνα και αντίσταση στους εχθρούς. Επιπλέον η επικράτεια και οι θάλασσές της είχαν γίνει πεδίο δράσης και ανταγωνισμού ξένων δυνάμεων (στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση των ιταλικών πόλεων, της Γένουας και της Βενετίας). Από τον ανταγωνισμό αυτόν η Βυζαντινή Αυτοκρατορία δεν είχε τίποτε να κερδίσει. Αντίθετα υφίστατο ταπεινώσεις και γνώριζε καταστροφές (όπως για παράδειγμα η άλωση της Ηράκλειας).